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Abstract: In this paper we present Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) simulations of the system for
underwater threat detection using neutron activation analysis developed in the SABAT project. The
simulated system is based on a D-T neutron generator emitting 14 MeV neutrons without associated
α particle detection and equipped with a LaBr3:Ce scintillation detector offering superior energy
resolution and allowing for precise identification of activation γ quanta. The performed simulations
show that using the neutron activation analysis method with the designed geometry we are able
to identify γ-rays from hydrogen, carbon, sulphur and chlorine originating from mustard gas in a
sea water environment. Our results show that the most efficient way of mustard gas detection is to
compare the integral peak ratio for Cl and H.
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1 Introduction
TheSABATproject (StoichiometryAnalysisByActivationTechniques) aims to design and construct
a device for underwater threats detection using neutrons as a probe for nondestructive stoichiometry
determination [1, 2]. The presently used methods are based predominantly on sonars which provide
only shapes of underwater objects and require additional inspection of a diver or an underwater
RemotelyOperatedVehicle (ROV) to assess if the object is dangerous. Thesemethods are expensive,
slow and do not provide identification of a substance inside the tested object. New, more effective
techniques are needed in particular for protection of harbors and off-shore infrastructure, contraband
uncovering and environmental protection, especially on sea areas of intensivewarfare, e.g. theBaltic
Sea, where over 300 kilotons of munitionwas sunk. Depending on the source, from 40 to 65 kilotons
of this arsenal are chemical agents [3, 4]. The main contaminated areas were determined within the
CHEMSEA project [5] and are presented in Fig. 1a. Moreover, unknown amount of dangerous war
remnants are spread over the whole Baltic, especially along maritime convoys paths. Exceptionally
dangerous is the chemical weapon dumped randomly near a seashore since it can be thrown ashore
during a storm. As it was shown in Fig. 1b the munition is exposed to various environmental
conditions due to different sediments composition on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. This affects
both the corrosion processes, detection possibility and proper planning of removal of this ecological
threat for which precise knowledge of the location and amount of these hazardous substances is
crucial.
Application of the Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA) may improve detection of underwater
dangerous substances providing non-destructive determination of their elemental content. It is
based on neutron pulse emission which excites nuclei of the investigated item. Detection of char-
acteristic γ quanta produced in de-excitation of the nuclei then allows one to identify the elemental
composition of the substance [7, 8]. The NAA is widely used in explosives detection systems op-
erating on the ground, such as EURITRACK or SWAN [9–11], but in the aquatic environment one
needs to overcome many difficulties related to technical aspects and strong background radiation
from oxygen and hydrogen. There is only one solution built and tested in the framework of the
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Figure 1. a) Map of the known areas of the dumped munition (blue rectangles). The solid and dashed curves
show the official and unofficial transport routes, respectively. The figure is adapted from [5]. b) Map the
Baltic Sea seabed composition, adapted from [6].
UNCOSS (Underwater Coastal Sea Surveyor) project. However, it aimed only on the detection of
explosives [12, 13]. An alternative solution for a detector which uses NAA technique and special
guides for neutrons and emitted γ-rays was proposed by the SABAT group [2]. The device allows
for detection of dangerous substances hidden deeper in the sea bottom with significantly reduced
background and decreased neutrons and γ-rays scattering. It also may provide determination of the
density distribution of the dangerous substance in the tested object [1, 7, 14].
In this article we present feasibility studies of sulfide mustard (C4H8Cl2S, known also as a
mustard gas) detection using the SABAT system without using the associated α particle measure-
ment. The huge environmental background is reduced by the use of a detection trigger allowing for
separate measurements of delayed and prompt activation γ quanta. For the latter, the use of neutron
and gamma guide tubes enhances significantly the signal to background ratio.
2 The MCNP simulations of the SABAT system performance
2.1 General model assumptions
We have performed Monte Carlo simulations with the MCNP v6.11 [15] and MCNPX-POLIMI
[16] packages using the ENDF71x library [17]. The high-performance notebook equipped with
Core i7 processor and computing cluster at National Centre for Nuclear Research (NCBJ) Świerk
Informatics Centre (CIŚ) was used. As a commercially available neutron generator we simulated the
operational conditions and geometry of a Thermo Scientific P385 pulsedD-T neutron generator [18].
It emits 14 MeV neutrons and offers a neutron flux of 3×108 n/s with normal operation mode. This
neutron generator can emit neutrons in a very short pulse of about 5 µs with duty factor of 5%. In
the UNCOSS project a 3" × 3" LaBr:Ce γ-ray scintillation detector was proposed for underwater
explosives detection [19], presenting excellent energy resolution of 2.9% at 662 keV γ-rays from
137Cs, high light yield and short decay time [20–23]. Following that recommendation, we included
a  2"×2" LaBr3:Ce scintillator into the simulation code.
The 14 MeV neutrons, due to their high energy, excite nuclei predominantly in the process of
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inelastic scattering which results in almost immediate emission of characteristic γ-rays. For a
continuous neutron beam some of the lines overlap with γ-quanta originating from the neutron
capture which are emitted after neutrons thermalize. Thus, to separate the prompt γ-rays from the
delayed ones we have simulated a short 5 µs neutron emission pulse, during which the data were
acquired through 2 µs in order to prevent registration of rays originated from neutron capture. The
detection of γ radiation emitted from nuclei after neutron capture was simulated with the same
neutron time emission of 5 µs as for prompt γ-rays detection, however, longer acquisition time
window between 10 and 100 µs after the neutron generator pulse was assumed. This time gate was
chosen taking into account thermalization of the fast neutron in the container with mustard gas,
which can take from several µs up to even 100 µs.
The scheme of the simulated SABAT system geometry is presented in Fig. 2. A submarine
(white rectangle) with dimensions 300 × 300 × 40 cm3, made of 3 mm stainless steel, contains
the 14 MeV neutron source (yellow dot) and cylindrical shape 2" × 2" LaBr3:Ce γ-ray detector
(light-blue) which is placed 50 cm from the target in the neutron generator (cylinder around yellow
dot). The neutron and γ quanta guide tubes (white polyhedrons under the submarine) are simulated
as 20 × 20 × 10 cm3 cuboid and 35 cm long polyhedron with a top and bottom base of 20 × 20 cm2
and 20 × 7.7 cm2, respectively. The γ guide tubes are also made of 3 mm thick stainless steel. A
container with mustard gas with dimensions of 194 × 50 × 50 cm3 in a 3 mm thick steel box (green
Figure 2. The simulated SABAT system geometry. A submarine (white rectangle) with the P385 D-T
neutron generator (black circle) and γquanta detector (light-blue) installed. The neutron and γ quanta guide
tubes (white, under the submarine) are simulated as cuboid and polyhedron, respectively. The irradiated
mustard gas is placed on the bottom of the sea (green rectangle) in a 3 mm thick steel container. Detection
of the mustard gas covered by 1 cm of wood and without wood was also evaluated. Details of the geometry
can be found in the text.
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rectangle) is placed on the sea bottom represented by dark-yellow rectangle (400 × 400 × 100 cm3).
Two series of simulations were carried out - one with covering the mustard gas container with 1 cm
of wood, and one without the covering. Both the submarine and guide tubes are filled with air
under normal pressure. Materials composition, except mustard gas implemented according to the
atomic fractions, were taken from the commonly available PNNL-15870 rev. 1 library [24]. To
evaluate performance of the detection system and estimate active background due to the presence
of water, we performed analogue simulations exchanging mustard gas with water. The surrounding
environment was simulated as water with 7.8h of salinity and traces of elements taken from [25]
on page 12 in Table 1 on the last column, expressed in mg/kg. The values were normalized to water
salinity. As a sea bottom, a sandy sediment was chosen, composed of 25% of sea water and trace
elements, presented in details in Table 1. This conditions corresponds to the bottom of the Baltic
Sea close to the shores (to the depth of 10 m) [26]. These areas are of the biggest interest since there
one has no information about the amount of chemical agents dumped into the sea (mainly because
they were thrown out of ships in an uncontrolled way). Moreover, the sandy bottom is common also
in many other water reservoirs of intensive war operations. According to literature the seashore
close to Poland, including Słupsk Furrow, is made of mostly of sand [6]. We implemented this
type of sediment in the simulation model, as the presence of randomly dumped chemical weapon
in this region is relatively high. The sandy seabed contains much lower amount of heavy metals
and is less saturated with water than the seabed at the Gotland, Borholm and Gdańsk deep [27].
The contribution of particulated organic compounds (POC) was introduced based on data provided
in [28].
Table 1: Composition of sandy sediment used in the simulation
model, according to [6, 27–29].
Element Mass ratio (%) Element Mass ratio (%)
H 3.30144% Fe 1.00237%
10B 0.00001% Co 0.00050%
11B 000002% Ni 0.00100%
C 0.35344% Cu 0.00100%
O 61.99990% Zn 0.00200%
F 0.00001% As 0.00080%
Na 1.34864% 79Br 0.00019%
Mg 0.00734% 81Br 0.00019%
Al 2.59482% 84Sr 0.00001%
Si 27.53650% 86Sr 0.00010%
S 0.00517% 87Sr 0.00007%
35Cl 0.08376% 88Sr 0.00086%
37Cl 0.02679% Cd 0.00010%
K 0.87891% Ba 0.00250%
Ca 0.84806% Hg 0.000002%
V 0.00100% Pb 0.00150%
Cr 0.00100%
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Composition of the sea water is based on the data from the PNNL database [24] with salinity
converted to that present in the Baltic Sea (7.8h in the simulation model). This is justified since,
according to [29], the ratio of elements traces in ocean and Baltic Sea is the same in relation to the
chlorine content. The simulation method was based on the solution proposed by Evans [30] with
determination of the average flux of de-excitation γ-ray in the detector instead of calculation of
particle flux through the detector surfaces. Finally, the MCNP simulation output data is normalized
to one source neutron. Thus, it has to be normalized with the neutron source flux of a system and
measurement time. Basics of the MCNP calculation are well reported in [31]. Since the detection
method is based on separate acquisition of γ-rays originating from inelastic neutron scattering and
neutron capture we did separate simulations corresponding to each case:
• for inelastic scattering we used F8 pulse height tally, with 2 µs neutron time cut-off and
neutron full analog capture forcing. In fact, this kind of measurement should be done with
lower neutron flux of about 107 n/s during 1000 s measurement time and 500 Hz pulse
frequency in order to prevent a very high count rate in a very short time and significant
number of pile-ups.
• for neutron capture γ-rays detection the simulation was split into two stages: initially the F4
tally was used with the T card for time gate measurement implementation. The output of
this part of the simulation is an average flux of γ-rays energy distribution. Then, as a second
step, the F4 output was used for F8 photon pulse height tallying in the detector volume only,
which result in obtaining the real shape of γ-ray energy spectra. The detector physics -
energy resolution, pair production and peak Doppler broadening, was also introduced. For
that simulation, we generated 3×108 n/s during 100 s measurement time, which is achievable
with the Thermo Scientific P385 neutron generator.
Table 2: The most prominent γ-rays emitted from the mustard gas
and the surrounding environment after neutron activation.
Energy (MeV) Nucleus Reaction type
0.79 Cl Neutron capture
1.17 Cl Neutron capture
1.78 Si Inelastic scattering
1.94 Cl Neutron capture
2.12 Cl Inelastic scattering
2.23 H Neutron capture
2.23 S Inelastic scattering
4.44 C Inelastic scattering
6.12 Cl Neutron capture
6.13 O Inelastic scattering
7.64 Fe Neutron capture
7.79 Cl Neutron capture
8.58 Cl Neutron capture
9.30 Fe Neutron capture
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The pulse height tally was used with the energy threshold set to 100 keV. The energy resolution
of the simulated LaBr3:Ce detector was included by the following full-width-at-half-maximum
(FWHM) parametrization set with the GEB card [23]: FWHM(Eγ) = a + b
√
Eγ + cE2γ , where
Eγ denotes the γ-quantum energy (in MeV), a = 2.0 · 10−4 MeV, b = 2.2 · 10−2 MeV1/2 and
c = 0.5 MeV−1. This parametrization gives the FWHM of about 2% for 4.44 MeV γ-rays. The
generated raw energy spectra with 10 keV energy bins were normalized to the number of histories
which were set to 1010 for prompt γ-rays detection and 109 for neutron capture γ-rays.
The most intense γ-rays emitted from materials used in the simulations are summarized in Tab. 2.
To demonstrate the feasibility of mustard gas detection with SABAT we focused on 2.12 MeV and
6.12 MeV lines of chlorine, 2.23 MeV peak of sulphur and 4.4 MeV γ quanta from carbon. The
presence of mustard gas can be detected by analysis of peak ratios for the mentioned lines and the
6.13 MeV chlorine and 2.23 MeV hydrogen peaks (for prompt and delayed γ-rays, respectively).
We have determined these ratios for simulations done with and without neutron and γ quanta guide
tubes and for different distances between the submarine and mustard gas container.
2.2 Mustard gas detection with de-excitation γ-rays
Distribution of the prompt γ-rays energies obtained with the sensor equipped in gamma guide tubes
and positioned 10 cm above the mustard gas is shown in Fig. 3.
Figure 3. The simulated energy spectra of prompt γ-rays registered with the LaBr3:Ce scintillator for the
case of mustard gas presence (black) and for background (red). In the lower panel zooms of the energy
spectra around the chlorine, sulphur and carbon peaks are presented. The inspection system was equipped
with γ and neutron guide tubes.
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One can see three γ lines related to the neutrons inelastic scattering on mustard gas, 2.23 MeV
from sulphur, 4.44 MeV from carbon and a weak 2.12 MeV line of chlorine which is barely visible
and overlaps with the γ-ray peak from iron. Thus, its detection is notably limited. The line from
sulphur covers ideally with the energy of γ-rays from hydrogen (2.23 MeV). However, the latter are
emitted after the thermal neutron capture, a long time after neutron pulse.
The estimated count rate using the acquisition time gate of 2 µs in the presence of mustard gas is
about 1500 counts per second (cps) assuming neutron flux of 107 n/s, 500 Hz beam pulse frequency
energy threshold of 100 keV and time acquisition gate of 2µs. It is important to emphasize that due
to a very short neutron emission period, as well as the acquisition time, further increasing of the
neutron flux could create significant amount of pile-ups in the scintillation detector and decrease
the detection performance.
2.3 Mustard gas signature with delayed γ-rays detection
In the previous section we showed the feasibility of mustard gas detection with prompt γ-rays.
Alternatively, detection of radiation originating from neutron capture could be applied for interro-
gation of objects in the aquatic environment. According to the MCNP simulations, this method
is much more efficient than the method based on prompt γ-rays from neutron inelastic scattering
for detection of mustard gas. In Fig. 4a an average photon flux distribution for mustard gas and
background is presented. The inspection system was again equipped with γ quanta and neutron
guide tubes. The significant excess of counts from Cl for mustard gas is clearly seen. We also see
γ-rays from 54Fe at 9.3 MeV as well as peak at 7.64 MeV from 56Fe. The main peaks of interest
from Cl are 1.17 MeV, 6.12 MeV, 7.79 MeV and 8.58 MeV. Although a peak from oxygen is known
to be present at 6.13 MeV it does not overlap with the chlorine. This is due to the fact that the
oxygen peak originates from the fast neutron inelastic scattering. The energy distribution of the
neutron capture γ quanta is presented in Fig. 4b. The Cl peak at 6.12 MeV is well visible.
Figure 4. Delayed γ-rays average flux distribution (a) and energy spectrum (b) in case of mustard gas
presence (black) and for background only (red). The acquisition time gate after neutron emission was set to
10 - 100 µs, with 5 µs long neutron emission pulse. The total simulated statistics corresponds to 100 s of
measurement with flux of 3× 108 n/s. The inspection system was equipped with γ quanta and neutron guide
tubes.
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Figure 5. The obtained Cl/H ratio as a function of distance between the mustard gas container and the
SABAT sensor simulated for mustard gas presence and background only.
2.4 Elemental peak ratios as signatures of the simulated chemical agent
As it was mentioned before, the detection of mustard gas can be performed by analysis of ratios of
peaks for chlorine, sulphur and carbon to the oxygen peak (prompt γ-rays) and to the hydrogen line
(delayed quanta). The peak ratios for all the elements of interest with the sensor distant by 10 cm
from the mustard gas container are presented in Tab. 3.
Table 3: Peak ratios obtained for mustard gas and background
with the simulated detection system equipped with γ and neutron
guides and without them. Results are presented for the submarine
positioned 10 cm above the threat.
Inelastic scattering prompt γ-rays - system with gamma guides
Peak ratio Energy (MeV) Threat Mustard gas Background
Cl/O 2.12/6.13 Mustard gas 0.37 ± 0.04 0.22 ± 0.03
S/O 2.23/6.13 Mustard gas 0.41 ± 0.04 0.23 ± 0.03
C/O 4.44/6.13 Mustard gas 0.24 ± 0.03 0.13 ± 0.02
Neutron capture γ-rays - system with gamma guides
Cl/H 6.12/2.23 Mustard gas 0.078 ± 0.003 0.014 ± 0.002
Inelastic scattering prompt γ-rays - system without gamma guides
Peak ratio Energy (MeV) Threat Mustard gas Background
Cl/O 2.12/6.13 Mustard gas 0.23 ± 0.02 0.17 ± 0.02
S/O 2.23/6.13 Mustard gas 0.27 ± 0.03 0.19 ± 0.02
C/O 4.44/6.13 Mustard gas 0.20 ± 0.02 0.13 ± 0.02
Neutron capture γ-rays - system without gamma guides
Cl/H 6.12/2.23 Mustard gas 0.062 ± 0.002 0.014 ± 0.002
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For the prompt γ-rays only the Cl/O and S/O ratio is greater for mustard gas than for the
background by about 3σ. On the other hand, detection of the delayed γ-rays provides much better
sensitivity with the Cl/H ratio. With the P385 neutron generator optimized for the delayed γ-ray
detection this ratio for simulated mustard gas with use of neutron and gamma guide tubes is equal
to 0.078 ± 0.003, comparing to the same value for background: 0.014 ± 0.002. Since we expect a
dependence of performance of the detector on the distance to the inspected object the simulations
were done for different positions of the device. In Fig. 5 we summarize the Cl/H ratios as a function
of the distance of the SABAT sensor and the mustard gas for system with and without guide tubes.
In turn the ratio in case of the mustard gas presence change with the distance and is much
higher for the device equipped with the guide tubes. According to the simulations the sensitivity
of the SABAT system elevated 50 cm above the inspected object is so low that one cannot see any
signal of the mustard gas presence.
According to literature [32], some of the dumped chemicals were placed in wooden boxes. We
evaluated the case when the mustard gas inside metal container is covered by 1 cm of wood. The
wood composition was taken from PNNL library [24]. However, we modified the wood density
to 1.2 g/cm3 and set 50% of its composition as the sea water, as it is strongly absorbed in wood.
Simulations were done for the SABAT device positioned 10 cm above the inspected object. Results
show that detection sensitivity with use of Cl/H ratio measurement method for that case is the same
in comparison with the model without the wooden box. Concerning the prompt γ-rays detection,
the slight signal above the background level was observed. Results were summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: Peak ratios obtained for mustard gas covered with 1
cm of wood and background with the simulated detection system
equipped with γ and neutron guides and without them. Results are
presented for the submarine positioned 10 cm above the threat.
Inelastic scattering prompt γ-rays - system with gamma guides
Peak ratio Energy (MeV) Threat Mustard gas Background
Cl/O 2.12/6.13 Mustard gas 0.31 ± 0.03 0.22 ± 0.03
S/O 2.23/6.13 Mustard gas 0.39 ± 0.04 0.23 ± 0.03
C/O 4.44/6.13 Mustard gas 0.27 ± 0.03 0.13 ± 0.02
Neutron capture γ-rays - system with gamma guides
Cl/H 6.12/2.23 Mustard gas 0.077 ± 0.003 0.014 ± 0.002
Inelastic scattering prompt γ-rays - system without gamma guides
Peak ratio Energy (MeV) Threat Mustard gas Background
Cl/O 2.12/6.13 Mustard gas 0.24 ± 0.02 0.17 ± 0.02
S/O 2.23/6.13 Mustard gas 0.27 ± 0.03 0.19 ± 0.02
C/O 4.44/6.13 Mustard gas 0.21 ± 0.03 0.13 ± 0.02
Neutron capture γ-rays - system without gamma guides
Cl/H 6.12/2.23 Mustard gas 0.062 ± 0.002 0.014 ± 0.002
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3 Summary
The first feasibility studies of the SABAT detection system revealed that the mustard gas detection
is possible in the aquatic environment even without the associated α particle measurement. Based
on the performed MCNP simulations we conclude that the separate detection of prompt γ-quanta
and radiation from the delayed thermal neutron capture gives the best performance of the detection
system. For the prompt γ-rays signal for sulphur and chlorine can be observed if the LaBr3:Ce
detector is used, although the sensitivity for the prompt chlorine γ-rays is rather low. This measure-
ment requires a neutron generator allowing for low repetition time between 100 - 1000 Hz and low
duty cycle of about 5% to suppress γ-rays originating from thermal neutron capture. Otherwise the
signal from sulphur could be masked by a significant number of counts from the hydrogen line of
exactly the same energy. The acquisition system used for prompt γ-rays detection should be able to
operate at high count rates in a short time period, up to 1 Mcps [33–35].
The simulations for γ-quanta originating from the neutron capture clearly show the feasibility of
chlorine detection, even if it is present in the sea water. This measurement appears to be much
more efficient than the detection of prompt γ-rays. The use of γ and neutron guide tubes improve
performance of the delayed radiation detection by 20% - 40%, depending on the distance from the
object which should not be greater than 30 cm in order to achieve sufficient sensitivity. The in-
elastic scattering prompt γ-rays detection can be considered as a supplementary analysis, providing
additional information after chlorine. It should be stressed that the detection of sulphur presence
may be important, as the mustard gas can be covered by organic compounds, which after exposition
to neutrons emit 4.44 MeV γ-rays from carbon.
The possibility of successful mustard gas detection using neutron generator without the associated
particle measurement allows for significant reduction of the cost and complexity of the device.
However, the recoil α particle registration would not only reduce further the background, but may
also give opportunity to obtain tomographic-like image of the inspected object. Knowing position
of the α particle interaction in the generator and the location of the γ-rays hit in the detector one
can use the time difference between these two measurements to determine the point of emission of
the γ quantum (detailed explanation of this idea can be found in [14]). Simulations show that the
elemental ratios for materials which can be likely found on the bottom of the Baltic Sea are much
different from the one for mustard gas (e.g. the Cl/H ratio for a wooden box was found to be 0.014
± 0.002). Steel elements, which are often found on the Baltic seabed, can be also discriminated
due to lack of Cl and H in their composition, thus, would not affect to Cl/H ratio. This shows that
SABAT sensor will be able to discriminate real threats from the safe items on the bottom of the sea.
Thus, our future studies will focus on checking feasibility of other substances detection (e.g. Clark
I or Clark II gases) and possible improvements given by the associated particle measurement.
Acknowledgments
Wewould like to thank prof. Steven Bass for proofreading of the article and many useful comments.
We acknowledge support from the Polish National Centre for Research and Development through
grant No. LIDER/17/0046/L-7/15/NCBR/2016.
– 10 –
References
[1] M. Silarski, D. Hunik, M. Smolis, S. Tadeja and P. Moskal, Design of the SABAT System for
Underwater Detection of Dangerous Substances, Acta Physica Polonica B 47 (2016) 497.
[2] M. Silarski and P. Moskal, Device and method for non-invasive detection of hazardous materials in
the aquatic environment, Patent number: P 409388, PCT/PL2015/050021, Mar., 2016.
[3] E. Andrulewicz,War Gases and Ammunition in the Polish Economic Zone of the Baltic Sea, in
Sea-Dumped Chemical Weapons: Aspects, Problems and Solutions (A. V. Kaffka, ed.), pp. 9–15.
Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, 1996. DOI.
[4] B. Filipek, R. Olszański, W. Harmata and P. Siermontowski, Chemical Warfare Agents in the Baltic
Sea, Polish Hyperbaric Research (2014) .
[5] J. Bełdowski et al., CHEMSEA Findings – Results from the CHEMSEA project (chemical munitions
search and assessment). 2015.
[6] D. Kyryliuk and S. Kratzer, Total suspended matter derived from MERIS data as indicator for coastal
processes in the Baltic Sea, Ocean Science Discussions (Feb., 2016) 1–30.
[7] M. Silarski, Applications of Neutron Activation Spectroscopy, Acta Physica Polonica B Proceedings
Supplement 6 (2013) 1061.
[8] P. Moskal, Nuclear physics in medicine, minefield and kitchen, Annales UMCS, Sectio AAA:
PHYSICA 66 (Jan., 2011) .
[9] B. C. Maglich, Birth Of ‘Atometry’ — Particle Physics Applied To Saving Human Lives, in AIP
Conference Proceedings, vol. 796, (Bonn (Germany)), pp. 431–438, AIP, 2005. DOI.
[10] B. Perot, G. Perret, A. Mariani, J.-L. Ma, J.-L. Szabo, E. Mercier et al., The EURITRACK project:
development of a tagged neutron inspection system for cargo containers, (Orlando (Kissimmee), FL),
p. 621305, May, 2006. DOI.
[11] . Kaźmierczak, S. Borsuk, M. Gierlik, Z. Guzik, J. Iwanowska-Hanke, S. Korolczuk et al., A Simple
Approach to Data Analysis for the Detection of Hazardous Materials by Means of Neutron Activation
Analysis, Acta Physica Polonica A 127 (2015) 1540–1542.
[12] V. Valkovic, D. Sudac, D. Matika and R. Kollar, An Underwater System for Threat Material
Detection, IFAC Proceedings Volumes 40 (2007) 13–18.
[13] C. Eleon, B. Perot and C. Carasco, Preliminary Monte Carlo calculations for the UNCOSS
neutron-based explosive detector, Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A:
Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment 619 (July, 2010) 234–239.
[14] M. Silarski, D. Hunik, P. Moskal, M. Smolis and S. Tadeja, Project of the Underwater System for
Chemical Threat Detection, Acta Phys. Pol. A 127 (May, 2015) 1543–1547.
[15] T. Goorley, M. James, T. Booth, F. Brown, J. Bull, L. J. Cox et al., Initial MCNP6 Release Overview,
Nuclear Technology 180 (Dec., 2012) 298–315.
[16] S. A. Pozzi, E. Padovani and M. Marseguerra,MCNP-PoliMi: a Monte-Carlo code for correlation
measurements, Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators,
Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment 513 (Nov., 2003) 550–558.
[17] J. L. Conlin and et al., Continuous Energy Neutron Cross Section Data Tables Based upon
ENDF/B-VII.1, Tech. rep. LA-UR-13-20137, Feb., 2013.
[18] B. A. Ludewigt, Neutron Generators for Spent Fuel Assay, .
– 11 –
[19] C. Eleon, B. Perot, C. Carasco, D. Sudac, J. Obhodas and V. Valkovic, Experimental and MCNP
simulated gamma-ray spectra for the UNCOSS neutron-based explosive detector, Nuclear Instruments
and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated
Equipment 629 (Feb., 2011) 220–229.
[20] E. V. D. van Loef, P. Dorenbos, C. W. E. van Eijk, K. Krämer and H. U. Güdel, High-energy-resolution
scintillator: Ce3+ activated LaBr3, Applied Physics Letters 79 (Sept., 2001) 1573–1575.
[21] E. van Loef, P. Dorenbos, C. van Eijk, K. Krämer and H. Güdel, Scintillation properties of
LaBr3:Ce3+ crystals: fast, efficient and high-energy-resolution scintillators, Nuclear Instruments
and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated
Equipment 486 (June, 2002) 254–258.
[22] M. Moszynski, L. Swiderski, T. Szczesniak, A. Nassalski, A. Syntfeld-Kazuch, W. Czarnacki et al.,
Study of LaBr3Crystals Coupled to Photomultipliers and Avalanche Photodiodes, IEEE Transactions
on Nuclear Science 55 (June, 2008) 1774–1780.
[23] P. Sibczynski, A. Broslawski, A. Gojska, V. Kiptily, S. Korolczuk, R. Kwiatkowski et al.,
Characterization of some modern scintillators recommended for use on large fusion facilities in
gamma-ray spectroscopy and tomographic measurements of gamma-emission profiles, Nukleonika 62
(Sept., 2017) 223–228.
[24] R. M. Jr, C. Gesh, R. Pagh, R. Rucker and R. W. Iii, Compendium of Material Composition Data for
Radiation Transport Modeling (PNNL -15870 Rev. 1), .
[25] D. A. Kulik and J. Harff, Physicochemical modeling of the Baltic Sea water-sediment column : I.
Reference ion-association models of normative seawater and of Baltic sea brackish waters at
salinities 1 - 40 %, 1 bar total pressure and 0 to 30 °C temperature (system
Na-Mg-Ca-K-Sr-Li-Rb-Cl-S-C-Br-F-B-N-Si-P-H-O), Meereswissenschaftliche Berichte No 6 1993 -
Marine Science Reports No 6 1993 (1993) 6,70 MB, 81 pages.
[26] E. Andrulewicz, Chemical weapon in the Baltic Sea relation to environmental and fish pollution level,
vol. II, p. 77-85. National Marine Fisheries Research Institute, Gdynia, Poland, 2016.
[27] S. Uścinowicz, P. Szefer and K. Sokołowski, Trace elements in the Baltic Sea sediments. Jan., 2011.
[28] T. Leipe, F. Tauber, H. Vallius, J. Virtasalo, S. Uścinowicz, N. Kowalski et al., Particulate organic
carbon (POC) in surface sediments of the Baltic Sea, Geo-Mar Lett 31 (June, 2011) 175–188.
[29] R. Feistel, S. Weinreben, H. Wolf, S. Seitz, P. Spitzer, B. Adel et al., Density and Absolute Salinity of
the Baltic Sea 2006–2009, Ocean Sci. 6 (Jan., 2010) 3–24.
[30] C. J. Evans, S. J. S. Ryde, D. A. Hancock and F. Al-Agel,Monte Carlo simulation of prompt gamma
neutron activation analysis using MCNP code, Applied Radiation and Isotopes 49 (May, 1998)
541–543.
[31] J. K. Shultis and R. E. Faw, An MCNP primer, tech. rep., Dept. of Mechanical and Nuclear
Engineering, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506, 2011.
[32] A. Szarejko and J. Namieśnik, The Baltic Sea as a dumping site of chemical munitions and chemical
warfare agents, Chemistry and Ecology 25 (Feb., 2009) 13–26.
[33] S. Korolczuk, S. Mianowski, J. Rzadkiewicz, P. Sibczynski, L. Swiderski and I. Zychor, Digital
Acquisition in High Count Rate Gamma-Ray Spectrometry, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science 63
(June, 2016) 1668–1673.
[34] G. Korcyl, D. Alfs, T. Bednarski, P. Białas, E. Czerwiński, K. Dulski et al., Sampling FEE and
Trigger-less DAQ for the J-PET Scanner, arXiv:1602.05251 [physics] (Feb., 2016) .
– 12 –
[35] G. Korcyl, P. Białas, C. Curceanu, E. Czerwiński, K. Dulski, B. Flak et al., Evaluation of Single-Chip,
Real-Time Tomographic Data Processing on FPGA - SoC Devices, IEEE Transactions on Medical
Imaging (2018) 1–1.
– 13 –
